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*Corresponding Author. E-mail: marian.vermeulen@ices.on.ca.496 AnnStudy objective: In 2008, a pay-for-performance program was implemented in sequential waves in Ontario emergency
departments (EDs), with the aim of reducing length of stay. We seek to evaluate its effects on ED length of stay and
quality of care.
Methods: This was a retrospective observational study of ED visits in Ontario from April 1, 2007, to March 31, 2011,
using multivariable difference-in-differences analysis. Pay-for-performance hospitals and matched control sites were
selected for each of 3 waves of the program. The primary outcome was 90th percentile ED length of stay; we also
examined quality-of-care indicators.
Results: Pay-for-performance hospitals had a modest reduction in overall adjusted 90th percentile ED length of stay in
wave 1 (–36minutes; 95% conﬁdence interval [CI] –50 to –21minutes), but not in wave 2 (–14minutes; 95% CI –30 to 2
minutes) or wave 3 (–7minutes; 95% CI –23 to 8minutes). ED admitted patients had a pronounced reduction in adjusted
90th percentile length of stay in wave 1 (–225 minutes; 95% CI –263 to –188 minutes) and wave 2 (–133 minutes; 95%
CI –175 to –91minutes). Nonadmitted low-acuity patients had reductions in adjusted 90th percentile ED length of stay in
wave 1 (–24 minutes; 95% CI –29 to –18 minutes) and wave 3 (–19 minutes; 95% CI –24 to –14 minutes). The program
did not negatively affect ED quality-of-care measures, such as 30-day mortality or readmission rates.
Conclusion: Pay-for-performance was associated with modest overall beneﬁts for ED length of stay without adversely
affecting quality of care. [Ann Emerg Med. 2016;67:496-505.]
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INTRODUCTION
Pay-for-performance incentives to drive improvements in
quality and efﬁciency have been increasingly used in health
care environments during the past decade.1,2 Initially, the
majority of pay-for-performance initiatives were targeted at
primary care.2 More recently, incentive programs have been
directed toward hospitals and specialist services.3 However,
the evidence for pay-for-performance programs to improve
quality of care and patient outcomes is mixed.4,5
The emergency department (ED) is one important area in
which pay for performance has not yet been
widely implemented or rigorously evaluated. Prolonged
ED waiting times and crowding are a concern in manyals of Emergency Medicinejurisdictions6-8 and are associated with important adverse
consequences for patients.7,9-11 However, concerns have been
raised about the potential risks to quality of care when the
focus is on meeting time-based performance targets.12,13
In 2008, the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term
Care launched the Emergency Department Wait Times
strategy to address ED crowding and reduce length of stay
(Figure 1).14 Several initiatives were implemented as part of
this strategy, including public reporting of ED performance
in 2008,15 setting province-wide benchmarks and targets for
ED length of stay in early 2009,15 a targeted ED process
improvement (lean) program to improve patient ﬂow within
hospitals in 2009,14 and the Pay for Results Program, a pay-
for-performance program that provided annual ﬁnancial
incentives to hospitals for improved performance on EDVolume 67, no. 4 : April 2016
Vermeulen et al Effect of Pay for Performance on Patient Waiting TimesEditor’s Capsule Summary
What is already known on this topic
The effects of pay-for-performance initiatives on
quality improvement and patient outcomes are mixed.
What question this study addressed
The authors evaluated the effect of a pay-for-
performance program implemented in Ontario,
Canada, on emergency department (ED) length of
stay and quality of care by comparing the change in
these outcomes 1 year after implementation between
program and control hospitals.
What this study adds to our knowledge
Short-term, modest improvements were observed as a
result of greater reductions or smaller increases in ED
length of stay in program versus control hospitals.
How this is relevant to clinical practice
The effects of pay-for-performance programs on
ED processes and outcomes deserve further study,
particularly the effect of design features and
contextual factors.length-of-stay targets, in April 2008.14 We sought to
evaluate the effect of the pay-for-performance program on
ED length of stay and determine whether it was associated
with any unintended consequences with respect to quality
of care. We hypothesized that the program would be
associated with an improvement in ED length of stay but
not associated with unintended consequences.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The pay-for-performance program was the ﬁrst
performance-based funding strategy directed at EDs in
Ontario. Hospitals were rewarded for improvements in
achieving speciﬁc benchmarks for ED length of stay, as
speciﬁed by theMinistry: a maximum of 8 hours for patients
admitted to the hospital or triaged as high acuity (deﬁned as
Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale16 level I [resuscitation], II
[emergent], or III [urgent]) and 4 hours for nonadmitted
low-acuity patients (Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale level
VI [less urgent] or V [nonurgent]).15 TheMinistry set targets
for compliance with benchmarks of 90% or greater. To be
eligible for funding, designated hospitals had to meet certain
conditions, including being an acute care facility with 20,000
or more annual ED visits that accepts urgent or emergency
ambulance patients 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Sites were
required to submit data on ambulance ofﬂoads, ED length ofVolume 67, no. 4 : April 2016stay, and other measures of ED quality of care for regular
review by the Ministry.
The Ministry determined eligibility for the pay-for-
performance program and selected sites for participation
annually. In wave 1 of the program (ﬁscal year 2008/2009),
Ontario hospitals with the largest number of patients
exceeding ED length-of-stay benchmarks were targeted,14
with subsequent expansion to additional eligible hospitals
annually. All participating hospitals were notiﬁed which
wave they were allocated to before the introduction of the
program; thus, lead time varied from a few months for wave
1 sites to at least 1 year for wave 2 sites and more than
2 years for wave 3 sites. Notice of annual performance
targets for the program was typically given between January
and March for the upcoming ﬁscal year. There were
23 hospitals enrolled in wave 1 (ﬁscal year 2008/2009),
with paid incentives totaling $30 million spread across all
hospitals.14 An additional 23 and 25 hospitals joined in wave
2 (2009/2010) and wave 3 (2010/2011), with incentives
of $55million and $100million, respectively.17,18 Hospitals
in waves 1 and 2 remained in the pay-for-performance
program through ﬁscal year 2010 to 2011. The ﬁrst wave
targeted extreme ED lengths of stay (>24 hours) and set a
performance goal of a 5% improvement in provincial ED
length-of-stay targets (Table 1). In the second wave, the
performance goal was 10%.The thirdwave set a performance
goal of 15% and also mandated a decrease in time to initial
physician assessment. Incentives were allocated internally
within each hospital, but there were stipulations not to use
payments to supplement physician income. Funds were not
restricted to the ED and could be used to improve ﬂow in
inpatient areas as well. Failure to attain speciﬁed targets
could render payments subject to recovery. There was no
“tournament” or competitive component to the payment
scheme, which allowed certain high-performing hospitals
to lead shared-learning events and activities facilitating
the dissemination of best practices. Table 1 describes the
framework and variation in performance expectations
associated with the pay-for-performance program in each
of the 3 waves.
Setting and Selection of Participants
We conducted a retrospective observational study of
ED visits among hospitals that were eligible for the pay-for-
performance program in Ontario from April 1, 2007, to
March 31, 2011. Frequency-matched control hospitals
were selected separately for each wave. A hospital could be a
control for multiple waves of the program; hospitals were
excluded as controls if they had participated in the pay-for-
performance program in a previous wave. Controls were
matched if the median ED length of stay in the year beforeAnnals of Emergency Medicine 497
Figure 1. Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care ED wait time strategy.
Effect of Pay for Performance on Patient Waiting Times Vermeulen et ala given program wave was within 0.5 hours of the range
of median ED length of stay at program sites.
We excluded low-volume (<25,000 annual ED visits)
hospitals (because ED length of stay tends not to be
prolonged at these sites), pediatric hospitals (because of
the difﬁculty of ﬁnding suitable controls for a small
number of hospitals), and hospitals that had participated
in pilot programs to reduce ED length of stay before the
introduction of the pay-for-performance program
(because we did not have data on the duration of their
participation in these and other programs to reduce ED
waiting times).
ED visits were identiﬁed through the National
Ambulatory Care Reporting System19-21 and hospital
admissions through the Discharge Abstract Database,22
both of which are collected through the Canadian
Institute for Health Information. The Ontario Ministry
of Health and Long-Term Care requires all hospitals
to submit all ED visit and hospital separation data
to the Canadian Institute for Health Information.
Deaths were identiﬁed from the Registered Persons
Database, a population-based registry of all legal
residents in Ontario.23 Neighborhood income
quintile and community type were derived from
Statistics Canada 2006 census estimates. These data498 Annals of Emergency Medicinesets were linked with unique encoded identiﬁers
and analyzed at the Institute for Clinical Evaluative
Sciences.
Outcome Measures
The primary outcome was 90th percentile ED length
of stay, consistent with the targets set by the Ministry.
This was deﬁned as the time from triage or registration
(whichever was earlier) to the time the patient left the ED.
Other outcomes included median ED length of stay, as
well as 90th percentile and median time to initial
physician assessment (deﬁned as the time from triage
or registration to the time the patient was ﬁrst assessed
by a physician). We examined ED length of stay
according to whether the patient was admitted because
performance targets differed according to admission and
others have found that benchmarks were associated with
an increase in ED length of stay among admitted
patients.12
We also examined a number of ED quality-of-care
measures identiﬁed in the literature and through a
Delphi panel process.24 These included rates of patients
who left without being seen by a physician,24 overall and
short-term (<48-hour) hospital admission, 7- and 30-
day mortality, 30-day readmission among admittedVolume 67, no. 4 : April 2016
Table 1. Pay-for-performance program features.
Program Features Wave 1 (2008/09) Wave 2 (2009/10) Wave 3 (2010/11)
Total number of hospitals
participating in the program
during each wave
23 46 71
Number of new hospitals
added in the wave
N/A 23 25
Number of sites included in study 19 19 22
Total funding for all hospitals,
CAD $, millions
3014 5517 10018
Fixed funding, CAD $, millions 3014 5517 60 (infrastructure funding, eg,
stafﬁng, space redesign)18
Variable funding, CAD $, millions None None 4018
Performance target: ﬁxed funding49 Extreme ED LOS* (>24 h) must
be reduced to a maximum of
2% of total patients
The % of patients treated within
the provincial ED LOS targets
must increase by 10% above
the 2008/09 baseline:
The % of patients treated within
the provincial ED LOS targets
must increase by 15% above
the 2009/10 baseline:
% of CTAS I/II patients with ED
LOS within 8 h and CTAS III
patients with ED LOS within
6 h must improve by a 5%
absolute increase compared
with 2006/07
Target for admitted and CTAS
I/II/III patients: 8 h
Target for nonadmitted CTAS IV/V
patients: 4 h
Target for admitted and CTAS
I/II/III patients: 8 h
Target for nonadmitted CTAS
IV/V: 4 h
% of CTAS IV/V patients with ED
LOS within 4 h must improve
compared with 2006/07
Local Health Integration Networks
(regional funding body) permitted
to add other performance
expectations for speciﬁc sites
The 90th percentile time patients
waited for an initial physician
assessment must decrease
Performance target: variable
funding49
N/A N/A CAD $100 per CTAS IV/V patient
discharged within 4 h above
baseline
CAD $500 per admitted patient
meeting 8-h target above
baseline
Capped in accordance with
available total budget
CTAS, Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale (I¼resuscitation; II¼emergency; III¼urgent; IV¼less urgent; V¼nonurgent).
*ED length of stay, deﬁned as time from patient registration or triage to the time the patient left the ED.
Vermeulen et al Effect of Pay for Performance on Patient Waiting Timespatients, and 72-hour unscheduled ED revisits among
discharged patients.24 We examined hospital admission
rates because the introduction of ED length-of-stay
benchmarks might lead to a change in admission
practices, and short-term admissions may be a proxy for
avoidable hospitalizations.
Study Design
Because selection criteria for pay-for-performance
hospitals changed fromwave to wave, we conducted separate
analyses for each wave according to the ﬁscal year they
were introduced to the program. We compared baseline
characteristics of pay-for-performance hospitals and controls
in the ﬁscal year before each wave with respect to age, sex,
ED length of stay, physician initial assessment, ED volume,
teaching hospital status,25 admission rates, percentage of
resuscitation and emergency patients (Canadian Triage and
Acuity Scale level I or II), participation in an Alternative
Funding Arrangement plan (a model of physician paymentVolume 67, no. 4 : April 2016typically based on an hourly rate instead of fee for service),
and participation in a Ministry lean program to improve
patient ﬂow or other lean-type interventions during each
month.
We conducted difference-in-differences analyses to
compare the change in each outcome in the ﬁrst ﬁscal year
after the introduction of pay for performance between
program and control hospitals.26-29 Regression model details
are shown in Appendix E1 (available online at http://www.
annemergmed.com).
This study received approval from the research ethics board
of Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre. Descriptive analyses
were generated with SAS (version 9.3; SAS Institute, Inc.,
Cary, NC).30 Stata MP (version 12.1; StataCorp, College
Station, TX) for Unix was used for all multivariable models.31
RESULTS
There were 87 eligible hospitals during the ﬁrst 3 waves
of the pay-for-performance program. Of these, 8 wereAnnals of Emergency Medicine 499
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Effect of Pay for Performance on Patient Waiting Times Vermeulen et al
500 Annals of Emergency Medicinelow-volume hospitals, 3 were pediatric hospitals, and 6 had
participated in pilot programs to reduce waiting times,
leaving 70 unique hospitals for analysis. During the entire
study period, there were a total of 1,857,009 ED visits at
19 wave 1 program sites and 1,825,209 visits at 20 control
sites; 1,903,040 visits at 19 wave 2 program sites and
2,015,649 visits at 27 control sites; and 1,786,913 visits at
22 wave 3 program sites and 547,398 visits at 10 control
sites. (Control sites in earlier waves may have gone on to
become program sites or may have acted as controls in
multiple waves; therefore, the total number of EDs
summed across all waves was 117.) Of the 8,010,957
unique observations in the cohort, none were missing age,
68 (0.001%) were missing sex, 4,580 (0.06%) were
missing Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale level, 115,594
(1.4%) were missing ED length of stay, and 1,478,826
(18.5%) were missing time to physician assessment. The
frequency of missing values was similar among program
and control sites.
Table 2 shows baseline characteristics of program and
control sites in each respective wave before the start of the
program. In some waves, program sites had higher volumes
(waves 2 and 3), were more likely to have participated in
other lean-type interventions (wave 3), were more (wave
3) or less (wave 2) likely to be Alternative Funding
Arrangement hospitals, or were more likely to be teaching
hospitals (waves 1 and 2) than control sites.
Figures 2 and 3 present the results of the difference-in-
differences models comparing the change in outcomes at
pay-for-performance hospitals with controls (full model
details are available in Tables E1 through E3, available
online at http://www.annemergmed.com). Figure 2 shows
the effects of the program on ED length of stay in each of
the 3 program waves. In these models, pay-for-performance
hospitals had small but signiﬁcantly greater reductions in
overall 90th percentile ED length of stay in wave 1 (–36
minutes) but not wave 2 or 3. Signiﬁcant reductions were
also observed in waves 1 and 3 sites for ED length of stay
among nonadmitted patients, and waves 1 and 2 sites
experienced reductions in ED length of stay among
admitted patients. Wave 3 sites had lower overall median
ED length of stay, 90th percentile and median time to
physician assessment, and length of stay for nonadmitted
patients, particularly those classiﬁed as low acuity. Figure 3
shows the effects of the pay-for-performance program on
ED length-of-stay targets and quality-of-care measures in
each of the 3 program waves. Improvements in targets were
observed for both admitted and nonadmitted patients
across all waves. The program was not associated with
any unintended consequences, and the rate of patients who
left without being seen decreased in waves 1 and 3.Volume 67, no. 4 : April 2016
Figure 2. Change in ED length of stay before and after the Ontario Pay-for-Results program among program sites compared with
control sites (difference-in-differences models). Adjusted for age/sex group, Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale group, participation in
the government-funded Emergency Department Process Improvement Program (lean), participation in other lean-type
interventions, participation in an Alternative Funding Arrangement plan, emergency department volume, teaching hospital,
calendar month, individual emergency department.
Vermeulen et al Effect of Pay for Performance on Patient Waiting TimesLIMITATIONS
This study had several limitations. Administrative data
are subject to inaccuracies, but we used some of the most
reliable data elements.19,20 Some data elements such as
time of initial physician assessment had more missing
data. Program assignment was not random and program
sites may have been different from control sites, limiting
generalizability. The number of suitable controls
diminished with each wave, and although we frequency-
matched controls with program sites, there remained some
differences in hospital characteristics (these factors were
controlled for in multivariable models); thus, there may
have been residual confounding. All EDs were required to
publicly report ED length of stay; this overlapped with the
pay-for-performance program, and hence we could not
distinguish the independent effect of each initiative.Volume 67, no. 4 : April 2016Although public reporting is associated with improvements
in quality-of-care measures and patient outcomes in some
settings,32 including Ontario,33 others have also observed
additional positive effects of pay for performance in the
context of public reporting.34 We did not have detailed
information about how ﬁnancial incentives were used at
individual hospitals; a better understanding of program
features could identify factors associated with success. It is
possible that some control hospitals became increasingly
engaged in efforts to reduce ED length of stay, which may
have diminished the effect among pay-for-performance
sites. Because a number of controls joined the program, we
did not have a sufﬁcient number of them to extend the
follow-up period beyond 1 year. Pay for performance in
health care varies, limiting generalizability to programs with
different designs. However, this evaluation did beneﬁtAnnals of Emergency Medicine 501
Figure 3. Change in ED length-of-stay targets and quality-of-care outcomes before and after the Ontario Pay-for-Results program
among program sites compared with control sites (difference-in-differences models). Adjusted for age/sex group, Canadian Triage
and Acuity Scale group, participation in the government-funded Emergency Department Process Improvement Program (lean),
participation in other lean-type interventions, participation in an Alternative Funding Arrangement plan, emergency department
volume, teaching hospital, calendar month, individual emergency department.
Effect of Pay for Performance on Patient Waiting Times Vermeulen et alfrom having no competing incentives in a single-payer
system.
DISCUSSION
Among Ontario hospitals participating in a voluntary
pay-for-performance program, there were moderate
improvements in overall ED length of stay compared with
that of control sites. In the ﬁrst 2 waves, reductions in ED
length of stay were most pronounced among admitted
patients. Overall performance with respect to benchmarks
also improved. In some instances, improvements in ED
length of stay represented greater reductions among
program sites; in others, program sites experienced increases
that were less pronounced than those at control sites.
These ﬁndings were consistent with the structure of the
incentives, particularly in the ﬁrst wave, in which the focus502 Annals of Emergency Medicinewas on reductions in extreme baseline lengths of stay. In
addition, program sites experienced greater reductions in
time to see a physician in wave 3 of the program, in which
this measure was explicitly targeted for the ﬁrst time.
We did not observe signiﬁcant adverse consequences;
rather, we observed a decline in the left-without-being-seen
rate among program sites in the ﬁrst and third waves.
On balance, these ﬁndings suggest modest improvements
associated with the use of ﬁnancial incentives to target
ED length of stay and provide evidence that there are
not unintended effects with respect to quality of care.
Recent studies of pay-for-performance initiatives show
few positive results, whether the incentives targeted
hospitals29,35-38 or primary care providers.5,39-41 Studies
of pay-for-performance initiatives in the ED are rarer, but
one before-after study found that payments for meetingVolume 67, no. 4 : April 2016
Vermeulen et al Effect of Pay for Performance on Patient Waiting TimesED length-of-stay targets were effective,39 whereas another
in British Columbia observed mixed results across different
health regions.42 In our study, the most sizeable gains
were found among hospitals with the poorest baseline
performance, ie, those in wave 1. These ﬁndings are
consistent with other research identifying greater effects
of pay-for-performance for the poorest performers.34,41,43
The design ofﬁnancial incentive programs in health care is
important to success.43 Programs targeting institutions with
larger ﬁnancial incentives and opportunities for shared
learningmay bemore effective than those aimed at individual
physicians or physician groups.29,37,44,45 Several features
of Ontario’s pay-for-performance program may have been
beneﬁcial, including paying the incentive to the hospital up
front and subjecting it to recovery if performance did not
meet targets, which would appeal to loss aversion46; an
absence of competition (ie, improvement was not based on
ranking amongEDs and all had an opportunity to achieve the
gains required to earn incentives),43,47 and shared learning
opportunities among participating sites.29 On the other
hand, some features may have limited success; for example,
incentives were not necessarily aligned with the dominant
funding structure (global budgets) for Ontario hospitals,
which for the most part is not linked to performance.48 In
addition, the program’s ﬁnancial incentives alone may have
been incapable of signiﬁcantly addressing access to inpatient
beds, a major contributor to ED crowding, especially in
Ontario,49 and could not address community resources such
as beds in chronic care facilities needed for the postacute
care of hospital patients because they are not funded by
hospitals.50 Finally, the annual incentive allocations may
have led to uncertainty about their sustainability and
reduced willingness to make longer-term investments.
This study examined ﬁnancial incentives directed at ED
length of stay in a large sample of EDs using contemporaneous
controls for comparison. Our results suggest that in a context
of a comprehensive strategy to address ED crowding, the
pay-for-performance program provided modest additional
beneﬁts (ie, attenuated deterioration or improvement in
waiting times) without adversely affecting quality of care,
which may mitigate concerns about the effect of pay for
performance on quality-of-care measures that are not
subject to incentives. A remaining question concerns the
sustainability of performance improvement through ﬁnancial
incentives. This study examined only the ﬁrst year after
implementation, and a longer period of follow-up may have
revealed greater effect, although several studies have found
that initial gains in quality-of-care measures and patient
outcomes attenuate over time.35,44,50 It is also unclear
whether more speciﬁc hospital characteristics or program
design features played a role in the variable effects acrossVolume 67, no. 4 : April 2016different waves of the program. In future research, attention
needs to be paid to sustainability, incentive design, and
contextual factors in determining the effectiveness of pay-
for-performance schemes.
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Details of statistical models
To calculate 90th percentile and median ED length of
stay and time to physician assessment, data were collapsed
into ED, week, age/sex group (male and female patients
aged 0 to 19, 20 to 44, 45 to 64, 65 to 74, and >74 years)
and Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale group (high [I to III]
versus low acuity [IV to V]) strata, and dependent variables
were calculated within each stratum; thus, patients with
missing data on age, sex, or Canadian Triage and Acuity
Scale level were excluded. Patients with missing data on ED
length of stay or time to physician assessment were not
included in the calculation of these outcomes but were
included in the calculation of quality-of-care measures. The
unit of analysis was the ED, week, age/sex group, and
Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale group stratum, and there
were 241,185 observations when data were collapsed for
modeling purposes.
Separate regression models were used for each outcome.
We modeled the change in ED length of stay and time
to physician initial assessment after implementation of
the pay-for-performance program, using generalized least
squares for serially correlated continuous data,1 applying
an autoregressive AR1 correlation structure, weighting by
stratum population. To model the change in the number
of patients meeting ED length-of-stay targets and505.e1 Annals of Emergency Medicineunintended consequences, we used generalized estimating
equations2 Poisson models for serially correlated count
data, applying an AR1 correlation structure, with the
logarithm of the stratum population as the offset parameter.
Because patients visiting the same hospital have correlated
outcomes, we clustered by hospital to adjust the standard
errors.
The change in outcome was modeled with separate
dummy variables for pay-for-performance and control sites
to compare the single ﬁscal year after the program started to
the previous ﬁscal year. For example, for wave 1 sites and
controls, we compared 2008/2009 with 2007/2008. In all
models, we then compared the change in each outcome
among program sites to the change among control sites
(difference in differences).3,4
Each model controlled for age/sex group, acuity (high
versus low), hospital teaching status (teaching versus
others), ED volume in ﬁscal wave 2007/2008 (volume
45,000 versus others), calendar month, Alternative
Funding Arrangement participation, and participation in
the Ministry lean program or other lean-type interventions
during each month. Other local lean-type interventions
carried out by hospitals from 2007 to 2010 were identiﬁed
in a survey of all EDs, which achieved a response rate
of 100%. ED ﬁxed effects were also included in the models
(dummy variables for each ED).Volume 67, no. 4 : April 2016
Table E1. Change in outcomes among pay-for-performance hospitals versus control hospitals, wave 1.
Outcome
Adjusted Mean or %
Pre-/Postprogram
Period Difference*
Difference in
Differences*Preprogram Period Postprogram Period
ED waiting times, min
ED LOS,† 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 703 (699 to 708) 731 (722 to 740) 28 (17 to 38) –36 (–50 to –21)
Control hospitals 695 (690 to 699) 758 (749 to 767) 63 (53 to 74)
ED LOS,† median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 252 (251 to 252) 253 (251 to 254) 1 (–1 to 3) –3 (–5 to –0.3)
Control hospitals 251 (250 to 252) 255 (253 to 256) 4 (2 to 6)
Time to initial physician assessment, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 252 (251 to 253) 253 (251 to 255) 1 (–2 to 3) –3 (–7 to 0.5)
Control hospitals 251 (250 to 252) 255 (253 to 257) 4 (1 to 6)
Time to initial physician assessment, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 102 (102 to 103) 102 (101 to 102) –1 (–1 to 0) –3 (–4 to –2)
Control hospitals 102 (101 to 102) 104 (103 to 105) 3 (2 to 3)
ED LOS,† admitted patients, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 1,808 (1,796 to 1,820) 1,978 (1,957 to 1,999) 170 (144 to 197) –225 (–263 to –188)
Control hospitals 1,766 (1,755 to 1,777) 2,161 (2,138 to 2,185) 395 (367 to 424)
ED LOS,† admitted patients, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 748 (743 to 753) 842 (834 to 845) 94 (84 to 104) –68 (–83 to –54)
Control hospitals 738 (733 to 742) 900 (891 to 909) 162 (151 to 173)
ED LOS,† nonadmitted patients, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 479 (477 to 481) 469 (466 to 471) –10 (–14 to –7) –6 (–11 to –1)
Control hospitals 477 (476 to 479) 473 (470 to 476) –4 (–8 to –1)
ED LOS,† nonadmitted patients, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 216 (215 to 216) 213 (212 to 214) –3 (–4 to –1) –3 (–5 to –2)
Control hospitals 215 (214 to 215) 216 (215 to 217) 1 (0 to 2)
ED LOS,† high-acuity nonadmitted patients, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 555 (553 to 557) 547 (543 to 551) –8 (–12 to –3) 0 (–6 to 7)
Control hospitals 554 (552 to 556) 546 (543 to 550) –8 (–13 to –3)
ED LOS,† high-acuity nonadmitted patients, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 250 (249 to 251) 248 (247 to 249) –2 (–3 to 0) 0 (–2 to 2)
Control hospitals 250 (249 to 250) 248 (247 to 250) –1 (–3 to 0)
ED LOS,† low-acuity nonadmitted patients, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 362 (360 to 363) 339 (335 to 342) –23 (–27 to –19) –24 (–29 to –18)
Control hospitals 356 (354 to 358) 357 (354 to 360) 1 (–3 to 5)
ED LOS,† low-acuity nonadmitted patients, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 162 (162 to 163) 156 (155 to 157) –6 (–7 to –5) –11 (–12 to –9)
Control hospitals 160 (159 to 160) 164 (163 to 165) 5 (3 to 6)
Targets/quality of care, RR
Admitted patients missing ED LOS† performance target
Pay-for-performance hospitals 57.26 (56.93 to 57.59) 62.33 (61.78 to 62.89) 1.09 (1.09 to 1.10) 0.93 (0.91 to 0.94)
Control hospitals 56.41 (56.08 to 56.74) 65.93 (65.29 to 66.56) 1.17 (1.16 to 1.18)
Nonadmitted patients missing ED LOS† performance target
Pay-for-performance hospitals 22.66 (22.51 to 22.81) 21.96 (21.73 to 22.18) 0.97 (0.96 to 0.98) 0.94 (0.92 to 0.96)
Control hospitals 21.96 (21.73 to 22.18) 23.00 (22.71 to 23.29) 1.03 (1.02 to 1.05)
Admitted
Pay-for-performance hospitals 13.03 (12.97 to 13.11) 12.40 (12.29 to 12.52) 0.95 (0.94 to 0.96) 1.00 (0.98 to 1.01)
Control hospitals 13.03 (12.96 to 13.10) 12.40 (12.28 to 12.53) 0.95 (0.94 to 0.96)
Short-term admission (<48 h)
Pay-for-performance hospitals 2.29 (2.27 to 2.31) 2.15 (2.12 to 2.19) 0.94 (0.92 to 0.96) 1.01 (0.98 to 1.03)
Control hospitals 2.30 (2.27 to 2.32) 2.14 (2.11 to 2.18) 0.93 (0.92 to 0.95)
Died within 7 days
Pay-for-performance hospitals 0.86 (0.85 to 0.87) 0.85 (0.83 to 0.86) 0.98 (0.96 to 1.01) 1.01 (0.98 to 1.05)
Control hospitals 0.87 (0.86 to 0.88) 0.84 (0.82 to 0.86) 0.97 (0.94 to 0.99)
Died within 30 days
Pay-for-performance hospitals 1.93 (1.91 to 1.95) 1.91 (1.88 to 1.94) 0.99 (0.97 to 1.01) 1.03 (1.00 to 1.06)
Control hospitals 1.94 (1.92 to 1.96) 1.87 (1.84 to 1.91) 0.96 (0.94 to 0.99)
Admitted patients readmitted to hospital within 30 days
Pay-for-performance hospitals 10.06 (9.94 to 10.19) 10.12 (9.91 to 10.33) 1.01 (0.98 to 1.03) 1.01 (0.98 to 1.04)
Control hospitals 10.09 (9.96 to 10.23) 10.03 (9.81 to 10.24) 0.99 (0.97 to 1.02)
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Table E1. Continued.
Outcome
Adjusted Mean or %
Pre-/Postprogram
Period Difference*
Difference in
Differences*Preprogram Period Postprogram Period
Discharged patients revisiting the ED within 72 h
Pay-for-performance hospitals 28.44 (28.34 to 28.54) 29.62 (29.44 to 29.80) 1.04 (1.03 to 1.05) 1.00 (0.99 to 1.01)
Control hospitals 28.38 (28.28 to 28.48) 29.60 (29.43 to 29.77) 1.04 (1.04 to 1.05)
*For ED waiting times, differences represent absolute differences in minutes. For targets/quality-of-care outcomes, differences represent rate ratios; all estimates adjusted for
age/sex group, Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale group, participation in the government-funded Emergency Department Process Improvement Program (lean), participation in
other lean-type interventions, participation in an Alternative Funding Arrangement plan, ED volume, teaching hospital, calendar month, and individual ED.
†ED length of stay.
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Table E2. Change in outcomes among pay-for-performance hospitals versus control hospitals, wave 2.
Outcome
Adjusted Mean or %
Pre-/Postprogram
Period Difference*
Difference in
Differences*Preprogram Period Postprogram Period
ED waiting times, min
ED LOS,† 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 571 (566 to 576) 559 (549 to 569) –12 (–24 to –1) –14 (–30 to 2)
Control hospitals 568 (563 to 573) 569 (560 to 579) 2 (–9 to 13)
ED LOS,† median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 196 (195 to 196) 195 (194 to 197) 0 (–2 to 1) –2 (–4 to –0.2)
Control hospitals 195 (194 to 196) 197 (196 to 198) 2 (1 to 4)
Time to initial physician assessment, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 201 (200 to 201) 203 (202 to 205) 3 (2 to 4) –6 (–8 to –5)
Control hospitals 199 (198 to 199) 208 (207 to 209) 9 (8 to 10)
Time to initial physician assessment, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 80 (79 to 80) 82 (81 to 82) 2 (2 to 3) –2 (–3 to –1)
Control hospitals 79 (79 to 79) 83 (83 to 83) 4 (3 to 4)
ED LOS,† admitted patients, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 1,877 (1,864 to 1,890) 1,794 (1,769 to 1,819) –83 (–114 to –53) –133 (–175 to –91)
Control hospitals 1,843 (1,831 to 1,856) 1,893 (1,868 to 1,918) 49 (19 to 80)
ED LOS,† admitted patients, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 755 (750 to 760) 778 (768 to 789) 24 (11 to 36) –15 (–33 to 2)
Control hospitals 751 (746 to 756) 790 (780 to 800) 39 (27 to 51)
ED LOS,† nonadmitted patients, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 375 (374 to 376) 373 (370 to 375) –2 (–5 to 1) –5 (–8 to –1)
Control hospitals 373 (372 to 375) 376 (374 to 378) 3 (0 to 5)
ED LOS,† nonadmitted patients, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 168 (168 to 169) 168 (167 to 169) 0 (–1 to 1) –3 (–4 to 2)
Control hospitals 168 (167 to 168) 170 (170 to 171) 3 (2 to 4)
ED LOS,† high-acuity nonadmitted patients, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 555 (553 to 557) 547 (543 to 551) –8 (–12 to –3) 0 (–6 to 7)
Control hospitals 554 (552 to 556) 546 (543 to 550) –8 (–13 to –3)
ED LOS,† high-acuity nonadmitted patients, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 197 (196 to 197) 197 (196 to 198) 0 (–1 to 1) –5 (–6 to –3)
Control hospitals 195 (195 to 196) 201 (200 to 201) 5 (4 to 6)
ED LOS,† low-acuity nonadmitted patients, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 286 (285 to 287) 278 (276 to 281) –8 (–10 to –5) –7 (–10 to –3)
Control hospitals 286 (283 to 286) 283 (281 to 285) –1 (–4 to 1)
ED LOS,† low-acuity nonadmitted patients, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 131 (130 to 131) 129 (128 to 129) –2 (–3 to 1) –3 (–4 to –2)
Control hospitals 130 (130 to 131) 131 (130 to 131) 1 (0 to 1)
Targets/quality of care, RR
Admitted patients missing ED LOS† performance target
Pay-for-performance hospitals 49.99 (49.66 to 50.32) 52.45 (51.91 to 53.00) 1.05 (1.04 to 1.06) 0.98 (0.96 to 1.00)
Control hospitals 49.80 (49.47 to 50.13) 53.25 (52.63 to 53.87) 1.07 (1.06 to 1.08)
Nonadmitted patients missing ED LOS† performance target
Pay-for-performance hospitals 14.26 (14.16 to 14.36) 14.39 (14.19 to 14.59) 1.01 (0.99 to 1.03) 0.96 (0.94 to 0.98)
Control hospitals 14.08 (13.97 to 14.19) 14.80 (14.62 to 14.97) 1.05 (1.04 to 1.07)
Left without being seen
Pay-for-performance hospitals 3.94 (3.91 to 3.97) 4.07 (4.00 to 4.14) 1.03 (1.01 to 1.05) 0.98 (0.96 to 1.01)
Control hospitals 3.91 (3.87 to 3.94) 4.10 (4.05 to 4.16) 1.05 (1.03 to 1.07)
Admitted
Pay-for-performance hospitals 11.07 (11.01 to 11.13) 10.67 (10.56 to 10.78) 0.96 (0.95 to 0.97) 1.00 (0.99 to 1.02)
Control hospitals 11.12 (11.06 to 11.19) 10.67 (10.58 to 10.77) 0.96 (0.95 to 0.97)
Short-term admission (<48 h)
Pay-for-performance hospitals 2.24 (2.22 to 2.28) 2.16 (2.12 to 2.19) 0.96 (0.94 to 0.98) 1.00 (0.97 to 1.02)
Control hospitals 2.24 (2.22 to 2.27) 2.17 (2.14 to 2.20) 0.97 (0.95 to 0.99)
Died within 7 days
Pay-for-performance hospitals 0.80 (0.79 to 0.81) 0.74 (0.73 to 0.76) 0.93 (0.90 to 0.95) 0.95 (0.91 to 0.98)
Control hospitals 0.80 (0.79 to 0.81) 0.78 (0.76 to 0.80) 0.98 (0.95 to 1.00)
Died within 30 days
Pay-for-performance hospitals 1.75 (1.73 to 1.77) 1.65 (1.62 to 1.68) 0.94 (0.92 to 0.96) 0.97 (0.95 to 1.00)
Control hospitals 1.75 (1.73 to 1.76) 1.69 (1.66 to 1.72) 0.97 (0.95 to 0.99)
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Table E2. Continued.
Outcome
Adjusted Mean or %
Pre-/Postprogram
Period Difference*
Difference in
Differences*Preprogram Period Postprogram Period
Admitted patients readmitted to hospital within 30 days
Pay-for-performance hospitals 11.40 (11.26 to 11.54) 11.45 (11.19 to 11.72) 1.01 (0.98 to 1.03) 1.00 (0.97 to 1.04)
Control hospitals 11.40 (11.25 to 11.56) 11.42 (11.19 to 11.65) 1.00 (0.98 to 1.03)
Discharged patients revisiting the ED within 72 h
Pay-for-performance hospitals 33.35 (33.26 to 33.45) 33.80 (33.59 to 33.97) 1.01 (1.01 to 1.02) 1.01 (1.00 to 1.02)
Control hospitals 33.38 (33.28 to 33.48) 33.57 (33.41 to 33.73) 1.01 (1.00 to 1.01)
*For ED waiting times, differences represent absolute differences in minutes. For targets/quality-of-care outcomes, differences represent rate ratios; all estimates adjusted for
age/sex group, Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale group, participation in the government-funded Emergency Department Process Improvement Program (lean), participation in
other lean-type interventions, participation in an Alternative Funding Arrangement plan, ED volume, teaching hospital, calendar month, and individual ED.
†ED length of stay.
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Table E3. Change in outcomes among pay-for-performance hospitals versus control hospitals, wave 3.
Outcome
Adjusted Mean or %
Pre-/Postprogram
Period Difference*
Difference in
Differences*Preprogram Period Postprogram Period
ED waiting times, min
ED LOS,† 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 484 (478 to 489) 471 (464 to 477) –13 (–23 to –3) –7 (–23 to 8)
Control hospitals 479 (475 to 483) 474 (461 to 486) –6 (–19 to 8)
ED LOS,† median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 182 (181 to 183) 174 (173 to 176) –8 (–9 to –6) –9 (–11 to –6)
Control hospitals 179 (178 to 180) 180 (178 to 182) 1 (–2 to 3)
Time to initial physician assessment, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 193 (193 to 194) 185 (184 to 186) –8 (–10 to –7) –10 (–13 to –8)
Control hospitals 190 (189 to 190) 192 (190 to 194) 2 (0 to 4)
Time to initial physician assessment, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 77 (76 to 77) 74 (74 to 75) –2 (–3 to –2) –6 (–7 to –5)
Control hospitals 75 (75 to 76) 79 (78 to 80) 3 (2 to 4)
ED LOS,† admitted patients, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 1,418 (1,402 to 1,434) 1,491 (1,470 to 1,512) 72 (41 to 104) 39 (–12 to 91)
Control hospitals 1,445 (1,434 to 1,455) 1,478 (1,436 to 1,520) 33 (–12 to 78)
ED LOS,† admitted patients, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 606 (599 to 612) 635 (627 to 644) 30 (17 to 42) –6 (–26 to 15)
Control hospitals 614 (610 to 619) 650 (633 to 666) 35 (18 to 53)
ED LOS,† nonadmitted patients, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 356 (354 to 358) 339 (337 to 341) –17 (–20 to –14) –15 (–20 to –10)
Control hospitals 350 (349 to 351) 348 (344 to 352) –2 (–6 to 2)
ED LOS,† nonadmitted patients, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 160 (159 to 160) 153 (152 to 154) –7 (–8 to –6) –9 (–10 to –7)
Control hospitals 157 (156 to 157) 159 (157 to 160) 2 (0 to 3)
ED LOS,† high-acuity nonadmitted patients, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 433 (431 to 435) 414 (411 to 417) –18 (–23 to –14) –13 (–20 to –6)
Control hospitals 426 (425 to 428) 421 (415 to 427) –5 (–11 to 1)
ED LOS,† high-acuity nonadmitted patients, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 192 (191 to 193) 185 (184 to 186) –7 (–9 to –6) –9 (–11 to –7)
Control hospitals 189 (188 to 189) 191 (189 to 192) 2 (0 to 4)
ED LOS,† low-acuity nonadmitted patients, 90th percentile
Pay-for-performance hospitals 271 (269 to 272) 254 (252 to 256) –17 (–20 to –13) –19 (–24 to –14)
Control hospitals 264 (263 to 265) 267 (263 to 270) 2 (–2 to 6)
ED LOS,† low-acuity nonadmitted patients, median
Pay-for-performance hospitals 124 (123 to 124) 117 (116 to 118) –7 (–8 to –6) –10 (–12 to –8)
Control hospitals 121 (120 to 121) 124 (122 to 125) 3 (1 to 4)
Quality of care, %
Admitted patients missing ED LOS† performance target
Pay-for-performance hospitals 42.00 (41.53 to 42.46) 43.17 (42.54 to 43.80) 1.03 (1.01 to 1.05) 0.94 (0.91 to 0.98)
Control hospitals 42.01 (41.63 to 42.39) 45.73 (44.47 to 47.00) 1.09 (1.06 to 1.12)
Nonadmitted patients missing ED LOS† performance target
Pay-for-performance hospitals 13.06 (12.92 to 13.21) 11.27 (11.10 to 11.44) 0.86 (0.85 to 0.88) 0.89 (0.86 to 0.93)
Control hospitals 12.44 (12.32 to 12.55) 12.00 (11.66 to 12.33) 0.96 (0.94 to 0.99)
Left without being seen
Pay-for-performance hospitals 3.83 (3.79 to 3.88) 3.35 (3.29 to 3.42) 0.89 (0.85 to 0.90) 0.93 (0.90 to 0.97)
Control hospitals 3.70 (3.66 to 3.74) 3.48 (3.38 to 3.58) 0.94 (0.91 to 0.97)
Admitted
Pay-for-performance hospitals 10.57 (10.48 to 10.66) 10.08 (9.96 to 10.20) 0.95 (0.94 to 0.97) 1.02 (0.99 to 1.05)
Control hospitals 10.49 (10.42 to 10.56) 9.81 (9.60 to 10.01) 0.94 (0.91 to 0.96)
Short-term admission (<48 h)
Pay-for-performance hospitals 2.19 (2.16 to 2.22) 2.11 (2.07 to 2.15) 0.96 (0.94 to 0.99) 1.03 (0.99 to 1.08)
Control hospitals 2.18 (2.16 to 2.21) 2.04 (1.96 to 2.11) 0.93 (0.90 to 0.97)
Died within 7 days
Pay-for-performance hospitals 0.78 (0.76 to 0.79) 0.78 (0.76 to 0.80) 1.01 (0.97 to 1.05) 1.06 (1.00 to 1.12)
Control hospitals 0.78 (0.77 to 0.80) 0.74 (0.71 to 0.78) 0.95 (0.90 to 1.00)
Died within 30 days
Pay-for-performance hospitals 1.66 (1.64 to 1.69) 1.66 (1.62 to 1.69) 1.00 (9.97 to 1.03) 1.04 (0.99 to 1.09)
Control hospitals 1.67 (1.65 to 1.69) 1.61 (1.55 to 1.66) 0.96 (0.92 to 1.00)
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Table E3. Continued.
Outcome
Adjusted Mean or %
Pre-/Postprogram
Period Difference*
Difference in
Differences*Preprogram Period Postprogram Period
Admitted patients readmitted to hospital within 30 days
Pay-for-performance hospitals 11.82 (11.59 to 12.04) 11.84 (11.53 to 12.16) 1.00 (0.97 to 1.04) 1.04 (0.99 to 1.10)
Control hospitals 11.90 (11.70 to 12.09) 11.42 (10.90 to 11.94) 0.96 (0.91 to 1.01)
Discharged patients revisiting the ED within 72 h
Pay-for-performance hospitals 34.68 (34.54 to 34.82) 34.88 (34.68 to 35.09) 1.01 (1.00 to 1.01) 1.01 (1.00 to 1.02)
Control hospitals 34.77 (34.65 to 34.89) 34.66 (34.33 to 34.99) 1.00 (0.99 to 1.01)
*For ED waiting times, differences represent absolute differences in minutes. For quality-of-care outcomes, differences represent rate ratios; all estimates adjusted for age/sex
group, Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale group, participation in the government-funded Emergency Department Process Improvement Program (lean), participation in other lean-
type interventions, participation in an Alternative Funding Arrangement plan, ED volume, teaching hospital, calendar month, and individual ED.
†ED length of stay.
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